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Since the mid-1980s, companies have introduced broad arbitration
agreements into many of their pre-dispute consumer contracts.1 The use of
arbitration has become popular because alternative dispute resolution (ADR)
processes have the ability to save considerable time and money compared to
litigation. 2 These agreements usually purport to apply to all claims arising
under the transaction, but they rarely contemplate the possibility of class-
action litigation or arbitration, 3 a procedure that is being increasingly
requested in arbitrations.
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I See, e.g., Johanna Harrington, Comment, To Litigate or to Arbitrate? No Matter-
The Credit Card Industry Is Deciding for You, 2001 J. DiSP. RESOL. 101, 102 (2001)
(describing the increased use of arbitration clauses by credit card companies); Jean R.
Stemlight, Is the U.S. Out on a Limb? Comparing the U.S. Approach to Mandatory
Consumer and Employment Arbitration to that of the Rest of the World, 56 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 831, 831 (2002) ("Since the mid-1980s, companies have increasingly used contracts
of adhesion to require consumers, employees, and other 'little guys' to resolve any future
disputes with the company through private binding arbitration rather than in court.");
Thomas J. Stipanowich, Resolving Consumer Disputes: Due Process Protocol Protects
Consumer Rights, 53 Disp. RESOL. J. 8, 9 (1998) ("Binding arbitration provisions are now
a common feature of banking, insurance, health care, and communication service
contracts, as well as arrangements for the sale or lease of consumer goods."); Eric
Weiner, Darcy Ting Defeated AT&T, Yet the Consumer-at-Large, Again Has Lost, 4
CARDOZO ONLINE J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1, 1 (2002), available at
http://www.cardozojcr.com/vol4nol/notes02.html. ("Recently, binding arbitration clauses
have become a routine component of nearly all consumer service agreements.").
2 There are also other advantages to ADR procedures. See STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET
AL., DisPUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION, AND OTHER PROCESSES 210 (4th
ed. 2003) (discussing potential advantages for choosing arbitration over litigation,
including having an expert as an arbitrator, knowing the decision of the arbitrator is
binding; having a confidential procedure, proceeding in an informal manner, and having
the opportunity to save time and money).
3 It is rare for the arbitration agreement to be any more informative than "all disputes
arising under this agreement will be subject to binding arbitration." In some cases, the
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A handful of class arbitrations have been conducted to date, and most of
these have involved significant judicial intervention from local district
courts. However, because the procedures are confidential, the exact methods
followed by the arbitrators are unknown. The Supreme Court's recent
opinion. in Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle4 now casts doubt on
whether these procedures are consistent with the Federal Arbitration Act.5 In
order to fill this legal void, the arbitral provider organizations have begun to
create rules and standards of fairness in both consumer and class-action
arbitrations.6
In order to determine how class actions should proceed, there are three
models that could be expanded to encompass the need for class arbitration.
First, class-action arbitrations could expand upon rules already in place for
consolidations. Many courts already have the authority to order arbitrations
involving similar facts or arising out of the same transaction consolidated
into one arbitration. 7  Second, the California courts have established a
company will specify that the arbitration will be governed by specific rules, such as those
for the American Arbitration Association (AAA), the National Arbitration Forum (NAF),
or Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services (JAMS). In very rare circumstances, the
company will disclose the actual terms of the arbitration agreement, including the
procedures that would govern the arbitration.
On its website, NAF offers examples of potential arbitration agreements in a variety
of circumstances. However, even these "approved" examples say little more than that the
dispute will be arbitrated and that the right to a jury trial has been waived. NATIONAL
ARBITRATION FORUM, DRAFHING MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION CLAUSES: A PRACTICAL
GUIDE wrTH SAMPLE PROVISIONS 6-18 (2003), available at http://www.arb-
forum.com/articles/whitepapers/clz903.pdf.
4 Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003). See infra Part II for a more
complete discussion of Bazzle and its effects on arbitration law.
5 Many of the complexities involved in arbitration law stem from the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000), a sparse statute governing little other
than the enforceability of arbitration agreements and the procedures for judicial review of
an arbitrator's agreement. Notably, the FAA does not provide guidance on the arbitration
procedure itself, such as choosing an arbitrator, determining procedures, and providing
for fees. As a result, the arbitrator provider services, such as the AAA, the NAF, and
JAMS, have created their own rules that are presumably consistent with the silence in the
FAA.
6 See infra Part VI.C.
7 Consolidated arbitration and class-action arbitration are two distinct procedures. In
a consolidation, an arbitrator will hear more than one similar claim in a single
proceeding, and all of the claims have previously been filed. In a consolidation, all of the
parties are "at the table." In a class action, one plaintiff or group of plaintiffs acts as a




"hybrid" of arbitration and litigation in order to conduct class arbitration. 8
This approach allows the courts to make determinations of certification and
notice, but permits the arbitrator to rule on the merits of the claim. A third
approach was taken by the American Arbitration Association (AAA). It
created the Supplemental Rules for Class Action Arbitration, 9 which closely
follow the requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
but allow the arbitrator to make the determinations of certification and
notice, subject to judicial review at various stages.
This Article examines how the standards of class action litigation can be
incorporated into class arbitration to create a process that is efficient and fair.
Part II addresses the threshold issue of arbitrability and the impact of Green
Tree v. Bazzle on class arbitration. Part III analyzes federal law and policies
governing class action litigation. Part IV addresses the issue of waiver of the
protections of federal court. Part V examines aspects of arbitration that may
jeopardize the fairness of class arbitration. Part VI critiques consolidation,
the "hybrid" class arbitration, and the new AAA Supplemental Rules.
Finally, Part VII sets forth a new approach to class arbitration, giving
increased power to the arbitrators to fully conduct class action arbitrations,
subject to a broader judicial review than is currently available under the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). This approach promotes judicial economy
while maintaining a process that is fair to absent class members.
II. THE FIRST QUESTION-ARBITRABILITY OF CLASS-ACTION CLAIMS
In general, the issue of arbitrability concerns whether the court or the
arbitrator will hear specific questions in the first instance.10 Traditionally, the
Supreme Court separated arbitrability questions into two categories:
questions of "procedural" arbitrability and questions of "substantive"
arbitrability.II Arbitrators typically hear questions of procedural arbitrability,
i.e., claims and defenses under a valid arbitration agreement, while courts
hear questions of substantive arbitrability, i.e., claims and defenses to the
own claims to be part of the class. See infra Part VI.A for more information on
consolidation.
8 See infra Part VI.B for more information on the California "hybrid" approach.
9 See infra Part VI.C for more information on these AAA rules.
10 See GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 2, at 230 ("Arbitrability addresses whether the
parties agreed to arbitrate the merits of a particular claim.").
11 See id.; see also Richard C. Reuben, First Options, Consent to Arbitration, and
the Demise of Separability: Restoring Access to Justice for Contracts with Arbitration
Provisions, 56 SMU L. REV. 819, 835-36 (2003) (describing the differences between
substantive and procedural arbitrability).
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arbitration agreement itself or its applicability to a particular claim. 12 The
Supreme Court has held that the courts are to determine whether an
arbitration agreement is valid, 13 or if the arbitration clause covers the claim at
hand. 14 Conversely, the Court has held in a line of cases that the arbitrator is
to hear other defenses to the arbitration agreement, such as fraud in the
inducement of the parts of the contract other than the arbitration agreement, 15
the validity of a statute of limitations defense, 16 and now even whether a
claim should progress as a class action. 17
Prior to Bazzle, the lower courts resolved the question of arbitrability of
class claims in contracts that are silent on the issue of class-action arbitration
in two different ways. The majority approach was for the courts to refuse to
12 Reuben, supra note 11, at 835-36. Professor Reuben notes:
[S]ubstantive arbitrability is understood to focus on the question of whether a
dispute is encompassed by an agreement to arbitrate. The focus here is on the
substantive merits of the particular dispute, and whether the parties agreed to include
it within the submission to arbitration. Procedural arbitrability, on the other hand,
focuses on a different question: whether any conditions that might trigger a duty to
arbitrate under an enforceable arbitration provision have been fulfilled. This
includes such procedural issues as time limits, notice, waiver, estoppel, and other
conditions precedent to the obligation to arbitrate. Under the doctrine of procedural
arbitrability, these issues are decided by the arbitrator, not the court, on the theory
that they are included within the scope of the arbitration provision.
Id. at 835.
13 First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 947 (1995) (holding that
the court of appeals correctly determined that because arbitration agreement was not
signed by both parties, the court should determine whether the parties even intended on
submitting their claim to arbitration).
14 See Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 452 (2003) (holding that
courts determine "certain gateway matters, such as whether the parties have a valid
arbitration agreement at all or whether a concededly binding arbitration clause applies to
a certain type of controversy") (citing Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S.
79, 89 (2002)).
15 Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 406 (1967)
(holding that a presumably valid agreement to arbitrate can be separated from the rest of
the contract, thus allowing the arbitrator to hear defenses, such as fraud, of the rest of the
contract).
16 See Howsam, 537 U.S. at 86 (holding that because agreement to arbitrate was
valid and because the court could not find any intention for the parties to submit the
statutes of limitations question to a court, the arbitrator should hear that claim in the first
instance).
17 Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 453-54.
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certify classes and then send individuals to arbitration. 18 A minority of
courts, namely state courts in California and Pennsylvania, held that courts
could certify claims for class arbitration. 19 These approaches have one
fundamental thing in common: They both require that the court, rather than
the arbitrator, make the initial decision on the availability of a class action
procedure.
The Supreme Court's decision in Bazzle essentially overruled all of these
lower court decisions on the issue of arbitrability. The Court held that an
arbitrator, rather than a court, should decide in the first instance whether
class-action arbitration is appropriate. 20 The Court stated that, "Under the
18 The leading case under this approach was Champ v. Siegel Trading Co., 55 F.3d
269 (7th Cir. 1995). The Champ court held that a court cannot certify a class action in the
absence of a provision in the arbitration agreement specifically allowing for such a
procedure. Id. at 276-77. Following Champ, this approach became the majority approach
for many of the other federal circuits that addressed this issue. See Dominium Austin
Partners, L.L.C. v. Emerson, 248 F.3d 720 (8th Cir. 2001); Randolph v. Green Tree Fin.
Corp.-Alabama, 244 F.3d 814 (11th Cir. 2001); Johnson v. West Suburban Bank, 225
F.3d 366 (3d Cir. 2000).
As a result of these rulings, companies could avoid class arbitration simply by
having an arbitration agreement that was silent on this issue. For this reason, Champ was
regarded as highly controversial. See Jean R. Sternlight, As Mandatory Binding
Arbitration Meets the Class Action, Will the Class Action Survive?, 42 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 1, 5 (2000) (noting that companies are using mandatory binding arbitration clauses
as a way to keep themselves out of class action litigation). See also Lindsay R. Androski,
Comment, A Contested Merger: The Intersection of Class Actions and Mandatory
Arbitration Clauses, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 631, 633 (2003) (criticizing those who
advocate for increased use of arbitration clauses by businesses hoping to draft around
class litigation); Scott S. Megregian & Todd Babbitz, The Use of Mandatory Arbitration
to Defeat Antitrust Class Actions, 13 SuM ANTTrRUST 63, 64 (1999) (finding that
arbitration can destroy the ability for plaintiffs to be class representatives, and it can
destroy typicality, a prerequisite for a class action). But see Edward Wood Dunham, The
Arbitration Clause as a Class Action Shield, 16 SPG FRANCHISE L.J. 141, 141-42 (1997)
(stating that the use of an arbitration clause can be an "effective tool" for companies to
manage the risks of being involved in class litigation).
19 The California case, Keating v. Superior Court, 645 P.2d 1192 (Cal. 1982), was
the first case in which a court allowed class arbitration and certified the case to be heard
by an arbitrator. In making this decision, the Keating court noted that arbitration and
litigation could work together in order to create a fair and efficient alternative means of
resolving this dispute. Id. at 1209-10. The Pennsylvania Superior Court, in Dickler v.
Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 596 A.2d 860, 866 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991), followed the
Keating rule.
20 Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, at 451-52.
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terms of the parties' contracts, the question-whether the agreement forbids
class arbitration-is for the arbitrator to decide." 2'
A large portion of the Court's plurality opinion considered the
boundaries of a court's role in enforcing arbitration agreements. 22 The Court
acknowledged that parties to an arbitration agreement might expect a court to
answer some questions of arbitrability, 23 such as whether the agreement is
valid or whether it applies to the underlying dispute; however, the Court
appeared to give almost every other question of arbitrability to the arbitrator
to decide. 24 The effects of this decision are twofold: (1) It increases power
given to arbitrators by abandoning the "procedural" and "substantive"
delineation 25 and (2) it seemingly endorses increased arbitrator involvement
in class-action arbitration.
The terse opinion that the Court issued in Bazzle leaves many questions
unanswered. Although Bazzle clearly asserts that the arbitrator decides the
appropriateness of class-action arbitration, the opinion gives no guidance on
when such a finding is appropriate or how a class action should proceed.
Two issues are particularly pressing. First, it is unclear whether parties can
"contract around" the Court's decision in Bazzle by expressly prohibiting
class-action arbitration. The arbitrator's powers are always limited by the
scope of the agreement,26 and if an arbitrator exceeds his or her powers, a
court will vacate the award. 27 Thus, it would seem that a company could
explicitly prohibit class-action arbitrations in order to avoid the situation in
Bazzle. There is one potential safeguard from a wholesale prohibition of class
21 Id. at 451.
22 In Bazzle, the Supreme Court did not focus its attention on § 4 of the FAA and the
power of a court to enforce an arbitration agreement.
23 The Court seemingly ignores the terms "procedural" and "substantive"
arbitrability. Instead, the plurality opinion appears to delineate between questions
involving validity and applicability and all other questions. In this way, the scope of
arbitrator questions has increased tremendously.
24 See Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 452-53.
25 A discussion on the new limits of an arbitrator's power is beyond the scope of this
paper. For more information on this subject, see Kristen M. Blankley, Note, Arbitrability
After Green Tree v. Bazzle: Is there Anything Left for the Courts, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 697
(2004).
26 The FAA recognizes that one of the grounds for review is if the arbitrator exceeds





arbitration-the doctrine of unconscionability.28 However, this question is
beyond the scope of this article.
Second, it is unclear how the class arbitration should proceed. The
decision in Bazzle does not address the role of courts in a class arbitration.
This is the first time that the Supreme Court has addressed the issue of class
action arbitration, and its reluctance to discuss class procedure is alarming.
The tenor of the opinion is that arbitrators are capable people who are
competent to handle the arbitrability question. 29 It would not be surprising if
the Court were to later hold that an arbitrator, rather than the court, should
handle not only the merits of the claim but also the issues of certification and
notice. Furthermore, because the FAA imagines a limited role for the
judiciary, 30 it is uncertain if the judiciary could be involved on issues other
than enforcement of the agreement, entry of the award, or a limited judicial
review.
III. CURRENT CLASS ACTION REQUIREMENTS IN FEDERAL COURT
Because there are few guidelines on how a class-action arbitration should
proceed, it is appropriate to turn to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for
guidance. 31 Rule 23 is widely regarded as a fair rule that protects the rights of
the litigants before the courts, and a similar rule in arbitration should likewise
protect parties in class-arbitration. Since consumer class actions are almost
28 There is currently a split among courts as to whether banning class relief is a basis
for finding that an arbitration agreement is unconscionable. Compare Circuit City Stores,
Inc. v. Mantor, 335 F.3d 1101, 1107 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding an arbitration agreement
prohibiting class-action arbitration substantively unconscionable), with Rosen v. SCIL,
LLC, 799 N.E.2d 488, 494 (Il. App. Ct. 2003) (holding that a prohibition on class action
arbitration does not make a contract unconscionable). For more information regarding the
unconscionability of class action arbitration clauses, see generally Jean R. Sternlight &
Elizabeth J. Jensen, Using Arbitration to Eliminate Consumer Class Actions: Efficient
Business Practice or Unconscionable Abuse?, 67 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 75 (2004).
29 Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 452-53 (stating that arbitrators are "well suited" to handle
questions of contract interpretation, including the question of whether a contact allows or
disallows class-action arbitration); see also Bellevue Drug Co. v. Advance PCS, No.
CIV.A.03-4731, 2004 WL 1924964, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 20, 2004).
30 See, e.g., 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2000).
31 Certainly, each state has rules of civil procedure regarding class actions, and each
state has courts competent to handle these claims. For ease of discussion, however, this
paper will focus on the federal courts and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
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exclusively actions for monetary damages under Rule 23(b)(3), this
discussion of class action law will be limited to the damages class action.32
A. Prerequisites for a Class
The Federal Rules set forth four explicit prerequisites that must be met
before a class can be certified.33 These, four requirements are commonly
known as numerosity, commonality, typicality, and representativeness. 34
The first requirement, numerosity, refers to the number of people in the
proposed class. A class can only be maintained if there is a significantly high
number of people affected by the defendant's action, so that the traditional
rules regarding joinder would be "impracticable." 35 Although there is no
minimum number of plaintiffs set by statute, courts have certified classes
ranging from "a few score"36 to hundreds of plaintiffs.
Secondly, the action must have commonality, or a similar question of
law or fact. 37 Commonality has been described as "the idea that [a] class
should be a class."'38 In order for the requirement of commonality to be
satisfied, the damage done to each individual plaintiff must be similar, or it
must arise out of the same set of circumstances. Although commonality can
still exist even if there are individual questions,39 commonality does not
extend to a class in which each plaintiff must individually prove liability and
damages.40
32 There are two other instances in which a class procedure is allowed under Rule
23. First, a class action can be maintained to prevent "incompatible standards" in cases
with a limited fund. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(b)(1). Second, a class action may be maintained in
order to obtain injunctive relief, and these cases usually involve civil rights. FED. R. Civ.
P. 23(b)(2).
33 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
34 Id.
35 Id. (stating that a class action can only be maintained if "the class is so numerous
that joinder of all members is impracticable").
36 STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 964 (5th ed. 2000).
37 FED. R. CIv. P. 23(a) (stating that there must be "questions of law or fact common
to the class").
38 YEAZELL, supra note 36, at 964.
39 See, e.g., In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practice Litig., 148 F.3d 283, 310
(3d Cir. 1998); Forbush v. J.C. Penney Co., 994 F.2d 1101, 1106 (5th Cir. 1993);
Johnson v. American Credit Co. of Georgia, 581 F.2d 526, 532 (5th Cir. 1978); Mosley v.
General Motors Corp., 497 F.2d 1330, 1334 (8th Cir. 1974).
40 See, e.g., Sprague v. General Motors Corp., 133 F.3d 388, 398 (6th Cir. 1998)




The third requirement is typicality.
41 To determine if typicality has been
met, the court must examine the claims of the class representatives 
and
determine if they are in line with the claims of the rest of 
the class.42 In order
to protect the absent class members, the representatives 
must be just that,
representatives of the class. If the class representatives 
have a claim
sufficiently unlike the claims of the class members, then 
any judgment that
might be received will have different effects on different 
people, defeating
the purpose of the class action.
43 Although typicality is important, the claims
of the representatives do not have to be identical to the 
claims of the rest of
the class.4
4
The fourth statutory requirement is adequacy of representation.
45 There
are many aspects to adequacy of representation. 
First, the named
representative must have an actual stake in the 
claim. If the named
representative does not have a stake in the claim, then 
someone else should
be named.46 Second, the lawyer cannot be tainted by 
having a relationship
with the client, such as a familial relationship, that 
would jeopardize the
lawyer's independence. 47 Finally, the lawyers themselves must 
be adequate,
meaning that they must be skillful enough to handle a class 
and either they or
Dickinson & Co., 214 F.R.D. 157, 164-67 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (finding no 
common question
of law or fact in a products liability claim in which the 
products and damage were
different for each class member); Fuzie v. Manor Care, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 
689, 700-01
(N.D. Ohio 1977) (holding that the claims were so individualized that 
there were no
common questions of law or fact).
41 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) ("[Tlhe claims or defenses of the representative parties are
typical of the claims and defenses of the class.").
42 Edward F. Sherman, American Class Actions: Significant Features and
Developing Alternatives in Foreign Legal Systems, 
215 F.R.D. 130, 139 (2003) ("[T]he
claims of the class representatives have the same general 
characteristics as those of the
class.").
43 The purpose of a class action is to efficiently handle a matter on behalf of a 
large
number of people in a manner that is fair and that does not 
jeopardize due process of law.
Id. at 130.
44 Communities for Equity v. Michigan High School Athletic Assn., 
192 F.R.D. 568,
573 (W.D. Mich. 1999); Markham v. White, 171 F.R.D. 217, 223 
(N.D. Ill. 1997);
Calkins v. Blum, 511 F. Supp. 1073, 1088 (D.C.N.Y. 1981) (holding 
that claims under
various social welfare states are still typical for the purposes 
of Rule 23).
45 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) ("[Tlhe representative parties will fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class.").
46 See YEAZELL, supra note 36, at 965.
47 Id.
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their firms must have the financial resources to be able to support this type of
complex litigation. 48
Adequacy of representation is not only required by Rule 23, but is
mandated by the Due Process Clause of the Constitution. As early as 1940,
the Supreme Court recognized that due process in class actions required that
absent class members be adequately represented by the named parties;
otherwise, another person's judgment cannot bind a litigant who did not
participate in the lawsuit. 49 The due process rights of individuals are
jeopardized when "it cannot be said that the procedure adopted fairly insures
the protection of the interests of absent parties who are to be bound by it."50
The Court did not specifically state what type of process is due for the absent
class members, but it did note that absent class members can only be bound
by a class action judgment if "they are in fact adequately represented by
parties who are present, or where they actually participate in the conduct of
the litigation in which members of the class are present as parties."' 51 Thus, if
the parties are not adequately represented in the litigation, the absent class
48 Id. One of the 2003 amendments to Rule 23 includes the addition of section 23(g)
on the appointment of class counsel. Under 23(g)(1)(A), the court that certifies the class
must also appoint the counsel to represent the class. The class counsel must "fairly and
adequately represent the interests of the class," FED. R. CIv. P. 23(g)(1)(B), a similar
requirement to the one in Rule 23(a). In making this appointment, the court is directed to
consider several factors relating to the attorney's experience, knowledge, and financial
resources. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(1)(C)(i). The court can also consider any other matter
that may affect the case, FED. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(1)(C)(ii), and it may request information
from the attorney regarding the representation and the fees involved. FED. R. Crv. P.
23(g)(l)(C)(iii).
49 Hansberry.v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32,45 (1940).
50 Id. at 42 (citing Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 235 (1897)).
51 Id. at 42-43 (citing Plumb v. Goodnow's Adm'r, 123 U.S. 560, 561 (1887)). One
of the leading civil procedure treatises noted:
According to traditional notions, a member of the class in a Rule 23 suit is
considered to be a party by representation, and will be bound to the same extent as
an actual party. But in order to be deemed a party by representation, a class member
must be represented in such a way that his rights are protected. Thus, an absent
member of the class, even when he is specifically identified in the judgment, will not
be bound if he can establish that to affect his rights would deprive him of property
without due process of law, either because the class was inadequately represented or
because of a failure to give him adequate notice. If the court finds that the member's
due process rights were satisfied in the first proceeding, then he will be bound.
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members have not been afforded due process of law and the earlier judgment
cannot bind them. 52
Both the California "hybrid" arbitration and the AAA Supplemental
Rules try to incorporate these Rule 23 prerequisites in order to assure that
class arbitrations proceed in a manner that is fair to both the individual
participants and the unnamed class members. In the California "hybrid"
arbitration, the presiding court makes all of the determinations regarding the
certification and the appropriateness of class status, and the judge is bound to
these rules of procedure regarding class status. The California courts have
recognized that the procedural safeguards codified in Rule 23 are important
even in the arbitral forum, and the California procedure requires that a judge
safeguard these otherwise constitutional requirements for the class members.
The AAA rules also utilize the Rule 23 prerequisites for certification, but
these rules require that the arbitrator, rather than the courts, determine
whether or not certification is appropriate. 53 However, if either party is
unsatisfied with the arbitrator's ruling, that party can appeal the decision to
the local district court.54 The AAA has also recognized the important
safeguards present in Rule 23, and it uses this rule as a guide for the
arbitrators to follow.
B. Notice and Other Requirements for a "Damages" Class
After the class meets the prerequisites mentioned above, a court would
have to determine if a damages class is appropriate. In order to maintain a
damages class, there must not only be commonality, but the common
questions must also "predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members, and ... a class action [must be] superior to other
available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the
controversy." 55 The reason for the additional requirements in a class action
for damages is to protect defendants from frivolous litigation.
52 The question of adequacy of representation can also be raised in a situation in
which subclasses may be appropriate. If there are competing issues present within the
class, subclasses may be necessary so that each subclass is adequately represented by a
named representative. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4); see also Sternlight, supra note 18, at 33.
53 See infra Part VI.C.
54 Id.
55 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). In order to determine if there is such a predominance, the
court can look at:
(A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the
prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation
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In addition to determining predominance, the court must notify all of the
potential class members of the pending litigation.56 Notice is mandatory in
the damages class action,57 so that all of the members are aware of the
potential recovery, and so that the court knows to whom damages should be
paid in the event of a recovery. 58 It must be the "best notice practicable under
the circumstances," and all known individuals must be "identified through
reasonable effort."'59 In many circumstances, the "best notice practicable"
will be an advertisement in a newspaper, magazine, or other media outlet that
will reasonably find potential class members. This is especially true for
consumer class actions that affect people across the country. Any notice
given must "state in plain ... language" items such as the "nature of the
action, the definition of the class certified, the class claims, issues, or
defenses, that a class member may enter an appearance through counsel if the
member so desires," that any class member can opt out of the class,60 and
that the judgment will be binding on all class members, including absent
ones.
61
Notice is not only required by Rule 23, but also mandated by the
Constitution. 62 The Supreme Court noted that due process requires that each
plaintiff receive "notice plus an opportunity to be heard and participate in the
concerning the controversy already commenced by or against any members of the
class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the
claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the
management of a class action.
Id.
56 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B).
57 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(A)-(B). This delineation makes sense for a number of
reasons. In a (b)(1) action, presumably all of the affected parties are aware of the limited
fund and already have notice of the class action. If the class is pursuing an injunction
under a (b)(2) action, notice is not always required because if the class is successful, the
injunction will benefit all and no money will have to be distributed.
58 See 2 ALBA CONTE & HERBERT NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASs AcTIONS § 4:17
(4th ed. 2002) (noting that courts are hesitant to certify Rule 23(b)(2) cases involving
damages, in part because there is no strict notice requirement-an important part in any
damages class action).
59 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B).
60 Note that all Rule 23(b)(3) class members are presumed to be members of the
class until they opt out. This type of class action is not an opt-in class. Notice is
especially important under these circumstances because the class members are already
members, and they can only exercise their ability to opt out after they receive notice
under Rule 23(c)(2)(B).
61 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B).




litigation, whether in person or through counsel.63 The test for notice in class
actions is the same test as notice of a suit under the landmark Mullane v.
Central Hanover Bank & Trust case.64 Notice must describe the litigation as
well as the absent class members' right to participate. 65 Furthermore, due
process requires "at a minimum that an absent plaintiff be provided with an
opportunity to remove himself from the class by executing and returning an
'opt out' or 'request for exclusion' form to the court."' 66
In a class-action arbitration, the arbitrator should take steps to protect the
due process rights of the absent class members by providing them with notice
that would satisfy the Mullane test. Notice should describe the class-action
arbitration, and it should allow the individual members to opt out. Individual
notice is, of course, best, but if the arbitrator cannot determine who all of the
claimants are, then he or she should ensure that any published notice is likely
to reach those affected by the proceedings. The AAA Supplemental Rules
allow the arbitrator to approve and oversee the notice. These rules on notice
are similar to the requirements in Rule 23, so it is clear that the AAA is
attempting to protect arbitration participants by instituting a version of the
Federal Rules. In contrast, the California "hybrid" procedure would have the
presiding judge rule on notice issues. Under this approach, the participants
are safeguarded by the rules of civil procedure because the judge is bound to
follow them in making these determinations.
63 Id. at 812.
64 Id. (holding that notice must be "reasonably calculated, under all the
circumstances to appraise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them
an opportunity to present their objections") (quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &
Trust, 339 U.S. 306, 314-15 (1950)).
65 See Phillips Petroleum Co., 472 U.S. at 812.
66 Id. The Court expanded its reasoning for allowing an "opt out" rule instead of an
"opt in" rule:
We think that the procedure followed by Kansas, where a fully descriptive
notice is sent first-class mail to each class member, with an explanation of the right
to "opt out," satisfies due process. Requiring a plaintiff to affirmatively request
inclusion would probably impede the prosecution of those class actions involving an
aggregation of small individual claims, where a large number of claims are required
to make it economical to bring suit. The plaintiff's claim may be so small, or the
plaintiff so unfamiliar with the law, that he would not file suit individually, nor
would he affirmatively request inclusion in the class if such a request were required
by the Constitution. If, on the other hand, the plaintiff's claim is sufficiently large or
important that he wishes to litigate it on his own, he will likely have retained an
attorney or have thought about filing suit, and should be fully capable of exercising
his right to "opt out."
Id. at 812-13 (citations omitted).
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What is common in the approaches of the AAA Supplemental Rules and
the California "hybrid" procedure is that they both draw guidance from the
requirements of Rule 23. Although arbitration is not a judicial procedure with
the protections of the court or the Constitution, these two bodies have noted
the importance of the Federal Rules in protecting both the named and
unnamed parties in class arbitration. Although these two approaches differ on
who makes the determinations of certification and notice, they both agree
that some variation on the rules of civil procedure is necessary for a fair class
arbitration.
Unfortunately, both of these procedures have their flaws, and neither one
is available on a nationwide basis. The California approach has only been
adopted in California, and the AAA rules are only in effect if the agreement
to arbitrate incorporates them. For these reasons, it is essential for Congress
to amend the FAA to provide uniform rules regarding class-action
arbitration, and those new rules should incorporate aspects of Rule 23 in
order to create a fair proceeding that protects both the named and unnamed
class members.
IV. ARBITRATION AGREEMENT AND WAIVER
Although a plaintiff who proceeds in court through class-action litigation
is entitled to the protections of due process, it is clear that a plaintiff has the
right to waive a court procedure and due process protections. 67 The Supreme
Court has not yet heard a case in which a class-action arbitration was
challenged because a party's due process rights were in jeopardy in the ADR
process. The Bazzle case did not address the question of waiver, but it did
note that the plaintiffs signed an agreement that contained a waiver clause.68
Any discussion of waiver in class-action arbitration, then, must be done by
67 Even Professor Stemlight, who opposes the use of class-action arbitration,
acknowledges that it is possible for a person to waive due process rights if the waiver is
express. Sternlight, supra note 18, at 117 ("[U]nless an arbitration clause expressly
provided that persons who agreed to its terms were waiving their due process rights to be
protected by a court in the event of a class action, the arbitration clause should not be
interpreted to have such an effect.").
It is interesting to note that there is no federal or constitutional right to proceed by
class action. The language of Rule 23 is permissive, not mandatory. The rule states that,
"One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties in behalf of
all," thus giving parties the right to proceed as a class, if they wish. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)
(emphasis added). However, once a class action has been initiated in court, the class
members are afforded the protections of Rule 23 and the Constitution.
68 Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 448 (2003).
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analogy to waiver in other arbitration cases. The Supreme Court embraces
two seemingly contradictory policies: to narrowly construe waivers of the
right to a jury and to favor enforcement of arbitration clauses. Each of these
policies will be discussed in turn.
First, the Supreme Court and the lower courts closely examine waivers of
a jury trial. The right to a jury trial can only be waived "knowingly and
voluntarily." 69 The reason that there is such a high burden to overcome is
because the right to a jury trial is "justly dear to the American people. It has
always been an object of deep interest and solicitude, and every
encroachment upon it has been watched with great jealously." 70 Many people
in a conflict expect that they can go to court in order to resolve a dispute, and
the presence of an arbitration clause in a contract may surprise many
disputants, especially consumers and employees. Thus, the Seventh
Amendment right to a trial by jury must be waived only if it was made
"knowingly and voluntarily."
Although the standard for a waiver of a jury trial is high, once a disputant
has waived his or her rights, arbitration will be enforced under Section 4 of
the FAA.71 Additionally, the Supreme Court has noted that there is a policy
"favoring arbitration," 72 so effective waivers will be enforced and the parties
will be sent to arbitration. Provided that there is no clear mandate by
Congress that a particular claim cannot be subject to arbitration, an
arbitration clause will be enforced in court.73 The Court in Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., though, added one limitation on the
availability of arbitration: The litigant must be able to effectively "vindicate
[his or her] statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum."74 Thus, Gilmer
69 See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 94 n.31 (1972) (quoting Aetna Ins. Co. v.
Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937)).
70 Jean R. Sternlight, Protecting Franchisees from Abusive Arbitration Clauses, 20
FALL FRANCHISE L.J. 45, 48 (2000) (citing Teamsters Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S.
558, 581 (1990)).
71 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2000) (stating that arbitration agreements can be enforced according
to their terms in any federal court).
72 This mantra was first stated in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury
Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983), and it has been repeated in most of the Supreme
Court's landmark arbitration cases. See, e.g., Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537
U.S. 79, 83 (2002); E.E.O.C. v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 289 (2002); Green
Tree Fin. Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 91 (2000).
73 See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) (quoting
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)).
74 Id. at 28 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 637). The Gilmer case
involved a claim of age discrimination under the ADEA.
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held that individuals can waive their constitutional right to a jury trial, even
when a plaintiff is given a statutory cause of action.
Even though the participants of class arbitration have likely waived their
right to a jury trial and to the Rule 23 and constitutional protections
associated with certification and distribution of notice, the law of class action
litigation is still useful for a discussion of class action arbitration. Class
arbitration is a new procedure, and to date there have been few guidelines on
how to proceed. Using the well-recognized and highly regarded law of class
litigation as a model for class arbitration will help protect all of the
participants in class arbitration.
V. ASPECTS OF ARBITRATION DETRIMENTAL TO A CLASS PROCEDURE
Although the class disputants have waived their right to be in court, the
arbitration process should still be fair and protect the absent class members.
This part will discuss certain problems that may arise because of the few
restrictions on who can be an arbitrator, limited judicial review under the
FAA, the necessity of confidentiality, and the effects of expedited
procedures.
A. Problems Relating to the Arbitrator
There are no requirements on who can or cannot be an arbitrator. 75
Unlike lawyers, arbitrators are not licensed by the state. In fact, many
arbitrators are non-lawyers, especially those specializing in labor and
employment disputes.76 Although arbitral providers, such as the AAA, can
place qualifications on who can be on their rosters, 77 an arbitrator does not
75 See Nicole Buonocore, Resurrecting a Dead Horse-Arbitrator Certification as a
Means to Achieve Diversity, 76 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 483, 484 (1999) ("Arbitration is
often called a 'profession.' Yet none of the traditional characteristics associated with a
profession, such as schooling in a particular field, testing, and licensing, apply to the
arbitration profession.").
76 See, e.g., Shalu Tandon Buckley, Note, Practical Concerns Regarding the
Arbitration of Statutory Employment Claims: Questions that Remain Unanswered After
Gilmer and Some Suggested Answers, 11 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 149, 174 (1996)
(noting that many highly qualified arbitrators are not members of the bar, but they are
keen minds with experience in the labor and employment industry).
77 For example, the ADR provider JAMS only hires retired judges and attorneys to
serve as neutrals for their organization. See JAMS: The Resolution Experts, at




have to be associated with an arbitral provider organization in order to be the
decisionmaker in a case if both parties agree to the appointment. Any person
with a shingle and an advertisement can begin work as an arbitrator, so long
as they follow the applicable ethical guidelines and they can find work.
78
One way to ensure that the arbitrator is qualified to hear a class-action case
would be either certify or license arbitrators. But this idea has not proven
popular. 79
Arbitrators are not required to follow the law when making their
decisions.80 One of the "benefits" of arbitration is that an arbitrator is
allowed to consider the equities of a case, even if those equities are
contradictory to the law. 81 Because of this longstanding perception of
dispute resolution providers from hiring and assuming liability for neutrals that have little
to no expertise.
78 In reality, most arbitrators are people well recognized in the industry, and it is
relatively hard to break into the arbitrator circles. The group of available arbitrators is a
closely-knit group of men, and the fact that there are few women and minority arbitrators
has caused a bit of a stir in the ADR world. See Buonocore, supra note 75, at 483;
Meghan L. Dunphy, Comment, Mandatory Arbitration: Stripping Securities Industry
Employees of Their Civil Rights, 44 CATH. U. L. REv. 1169, 1195 (1995) (noting that
most arbitrators become arbitrators because they know someone who is currently an
arbitrator) (citing Mario F. Bognanno & Clifford E. Smith, The Demographic and
Professional Characteristics of Arbitrators in North America, 41 NAT'L ACAD. OF ARB.
PROC. 266, 273-75 (1989) (statistics on arbitrators)).
Despite the fact that it is not particularly easy to become an arbitrator that will
actually generate business, the state of the law remains that anyone can pick up the
practice and perhaps get lucky and find some clients. The purpose of this part is to point
out that there are currently no restrictions on the practice of being an arbitrator.
79 See Buonocore, supra note 75, at 495-99.
80 See, e.g., Edward Brunet, Seeking Optimal Dispute Resolution Clauses in High
Stakes Employment Contracts, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 107, 111 (2002)
("Because courts do not require that arbitrators apply correct substantive legal rules to a
dispute, equity-based arbitration results are typical.") (footnote omitted); Murray S.
Levin, The Role of Substantive Law in Business Arbitration and the Importance of
Volition, 35 Am. Bus. L.J. 105, 118 (1997) (noting that provider organizations such as the
AAA do not place much emphasis on the role of substantive law and often encourage
arbitrators to craft awards based on the equity); Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from
Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law Through Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REv. 703, 719-20
(1999) (noting that up to 90% of arbitrators would disregard the law in order to reach an
equitable result in a case).
81 See, e.g., Brunet, supra note 80, at 110-12 ("Traditionally, arbitrators were
seldom lawyers but were fellow merchants in the same business as the disputants and
were selected because of the expectation that they would decide using industry custom
and usage norms."); Maureen A. Weston, Checks on Participant Conduct in Compulsory
ADR: Reconciling the Tension in the Need for Good-Faith Participation, Autonomy, and
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arbitration, there may be a worry that arbitrators that do not understand the
complexities of class action law may, instead, turn to the equities of the case
and decide procedural issues on those grounds. 82
If an arbitrator cannot effectively handle these issues of law and policy,
extensive judicial supervision will be necessary in order to effectively
safeguard the due process rights of the unnamed parties. 83 The "hybrid"
version of class arbitration in California solves this problem by allowing the
judge to make the determinations of certification and notice. The judge could
also be asked to make other determinations specific to each given case if the
arbitrator is unable to handle the situation. The relationship, then, between
the arbitrator and the court might become complex, and the case would move
back and forth between the arbitrator and the judge, increasing the time and
cost of the procedure.
The "hybrid" approach, however, appears to dramatically underestimate
the ability of an arbitrator to become educated in the issue of class action law
and to follow it. If the pool of potential arbitrators can be limited to those
with legal or judicial training, the potential arbitrators should be well-
equipped to read Supreme Court precedent and follow it with little difficulty.
Provided that lawmakers can articulate what type of person can successfully
protect the absent class members, this arbitrator should be trusted to act in
accordance with class action law.
Confidentiality, 76 IND. L.J. 591, 594 (2001) (stating that, because of ADR
confidentiality, neutrals do not necessarily have to follow the law).
82 One example of this criticism may be that an arbitrator would not be able to
recognize what qualifies as notice satisfying the Mullane test. An arbitrator may not
know that it should follow Mullane, or an arbitrator may be unclear as to what Mullane
requires. If the arbitrator is unclear as to what effective notice should look like, the
arbitrator may just issue notice that appears to be equitable, even if it would not satisfy
the Mullane standard.
83 See Androski, supra note 18, at 645 ("[C]lass certification, notice requirements,
and designation of an appropriate class representative involve complicated legal
questions on which arbitrators may be more likely than judges to commit error.")
(footnote omitted); Stemlight, supra note 18, at 52-53; C. Evan Stewart, Are Class
Actions Appropriate in Arbitrations?, N.Y. L.J., June 13, 1991, at 6 ("The court's role at
the certification stage cannot suddenly be stopped; it must carry on to such stages as
notice, settlement, protection of class members, etc. It is inconceivable to believe that
non-Article III arbitrators could properly oversee, for example, the notice procedures




B. Limited Judicial Review Under the Federal Arbitration Act
Another common criticism of arbitration is that the arbitrator's decision
is subject to a limited judicial review. Under the FAA, an arbitrator's
decision can only be reviewed in the event of misconduct, fraud, bias on the
part of the arbitrator, or if the arbitrator acted outside of the powers given to
him or her as defined in the arbitration agreement. 84 Any potential problems
with the capability of the arbitrator are exacerbated by the fact that any
mistakes made during the hearing will be binding on the parties in the
absence of fraud or misconduct. Furthermore, under the FAA, the arbitral
award can only be appealed after the process is over, 85 but in court, a
disappointed party can move for an interlocutory appeal after the certification
is complete.
Although this is a serious concern for class-action arbitration, it is worth
noting that the judicial review employed by courts is also limited. If a district
court denies certification, this is only reviewable on an abuse of discretion
standard.86 Appellate courts also employ an abuse of discretion standard
when reviewing the lower courts' decisions on the notice employed in the
class action.87 Although appellate review for class litigation is broader than
judicial review of an arbitrator's decision, the review is still quite limited in
both instances.
84 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2000). An award may be modified, rather than vacated, if there
is a miscalculation in the award or if the award has other problems not relating to the
merits of the case. Id. § 11.
85 See id. § 10. The AAA Supplemental Rules create an opportunity for a procedure
similar to the interlocutory appeal in the federal courts. The AAA Rules allow either
party to appeal to the district court the arbitrator's ruling on certification. See infra Part
VI.C. Although this procedure makes class arbitration more similar to class litigation, it
may turn class arbitration into an overly burdensome process. Furthermore, it is unclear
what standard of review the court should employ when making this judicial review.
86 See, e.g., Murray v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 365 F.3d 1284, 1287 (11th Cir. 2004);
Similow v. S.W. Bell Mobile Sys., Inc., 323 F.3d 32, 37 (1st Cir. 2003); Wooden v. Bd.
of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 247 F.3d 1262, 1271 (11th Cir. 2001); Zimmerman
v. HBO Affiliate Group, 834 F.2d 1163, 1169-70 (3rd Cir. 1987); Jenkins v. Raymark
Indus., 782 F.2d 468, 471-72 (5th Cir. 1986).
87 See, e.g., In re Diet Drugs, 2004 WL 326971, at *342 (3d Cir. 2004); Cruz v.
American Airlines, Inc., 356 F.3d 320, 328 (D.C. Cir. 2004) ("The district court's
decision not to order notice to the class is also a matter within the court's 'discretion,'
and so we will also reverse that only if the decision was an abuse of discretion.") (citation
omitted).
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C. Confidentiality-the Double-Edged Sword
Confidentiality is usually heralded as the biggest advantage of choosing
an ADR procedure, including arbitration, over litigation.88 Under the cover
of confidentiality, the parties should feel free to disclose information in the
procedure knowing that the information will not be used against them in a
subsequent proceeding. 89 The Revised Uniform Arbitration Act, meant as a
model law for states to adopt, precludes the arbitrator from testifying in a
subsequent proceeding by declaring that the arbitrator is an incompetent
witness. 90 Many parties would probably refuse to attend arbitration if they
knew that their documents and statements could be submitted to a court or
even a newspaper. So, in many ways, confidentiality is essential to any ADR
procedure.
Broad confidentiality provisions, however, may appear to preclude notice
from being disseminated to absent parties, especially if the notice takes the
form of publication. For notice to be constitutional under Mullane and Shutts,
it must reveal the named parties, the nature of the action, the option for an
absent class member to opt out, and a rough timetable as to when she has to
exercise such an option. 91 However, revealing this information potentially
88 See, e.g., Robert J. Lewton, Are Mandatory Binding Arbitration Requirements a
Viable Solution for Employers Seeking to Avoid Litigating Statutory Employment
Discrimination Claims?, 59 ALB. L. REV. 991, 1028 (1996) (noting that employers
choose arbitration, in part, to have a confidential dispute resolution procedure).
89 Caroline Harris Crowne, Note, The Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998:
Implementing a New Paradigm of Justice, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1768, 1778 (2001) (finding
that confidentiality is common in ADR processes in order to make the disputants feel
more comfortable and secure with the process); Weston, supra note 81, at 594 (the
promise of confidentiality helps encourage candor in discussions and presentations of
evidence).
90 REVISED UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT § 14(d), reprinted in GOLDBERG ET AL.,
supra note 2, at 633. This section states:
In a judicial, administrative, or similar proceeding, an arbitrator or
representative of an arbitration organization is not competent to testify, and may not
be required to produce records as to any statement, conduct, decision, or ruling
occurring during the arbitration proceeding, to the same extent a judge of a court of
this State acting in a judicial capacity.
Id.
91 The Supreme Court did not explicitly state what would have to be in the notice,
other than it would have to satisfy Mullane, but it did state that the notice given in the
Phillips Petroleum Co. case was sufficient. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S.
797, 812-13 (1985). The notice in Phillips Petroleum Co. included a description of the




breaches confidentiality. Plaintiffs and defendants who chose arbitration in
order to stay out of the press may be disappointed if the media learns of the
case because of the dispensation of notice to absent class members.
The right to confidentiality of named class members must be balanced
against the right to notice for unnamed class members. For obvious reasons,
the rights of the absent class members should prevail in this situation. The
notice would have to disclose certain information, such as the names of the
parties, a general description of the claim, and perhaps some outline or
timetable for the expected procedures. This is a limited disclosure that must
be tolerated by the named parties. Unlike class-action litigation, the briefs,
rulings, motions, hearings, and most other statements could still be
confidential and not part of the public record.
Confidentiality may come up in one other respect: review of a final
decision by the arbitrator. As noted above, the arbitration should be subject
to review greater than FAA § 10 review, and the challenging party will have
to submit evidence to the judge in order to show why the arbitrator
incorrectly decided the case. A judge would probably view a transcript as the
best available evidence of an abuse of discretion. Transcripts have been
entered into evidence in judicial review of arbitration rulings and mediation
settlements,92 and it is unclear how the rules of confidentiality apply in these
cases. Currently, evidence of misconduct by third-party neutrals can be
admitted, despite confidentiality concerns, 93 and this exception would have
to be extended in order to challenge an arbitrator's ruling in a class action. If
due process requires that there is expanded review, then the review must be
meaningful, and meaningful review will have to give way to confidentiality.
Thus, class-action arbitration law will have to be amended in two
respects regarding confidentiality. First, it will have to allow notice to reach
opt out of the litigation in order to pursue a different claim against the same defendants.
Id.
92 See, e.g., Local Union 15 v. Exelon, 2004 WL 769431, *1 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (over
2,400 pages of arbitration transcript were entered into evidence); New England Homes,
Inc. v. R.J. Guarnaccia Irrevocable Trust, 846 A.2d 502, 506 (N.H. 2004) (reviewing the
arbitration transcript and determining that the award rendered in arbitration was not
supported by evidence); International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees and
Moving Picture Machine Operators of U.S. and Canada Local No. 16 v. Laughon, 12 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 522, 524 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (district court based its finding of no "obvious
bias or prejudice" of the arbitrator on an examination of the arbitration transcript);
Cooper v. Maytag, Co., 2004 WL 573663, *1 (Iowa Ct. App. 2004) (plaintiff submitted
the transcript from a workman's compensation arbitration as evidence).
93 See REVISED UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT § 14, reprinted in GOLDBERG ET AL.,
supra note 2, at 633 (stating that an arbitrator can introduce evidence into a trial in which
the arbitrator has been sued for professional malpractice).
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all potential class members, even if that requires publication of the notice
containing a description of the action. Second, the confidentiality rules will
have to contain an exception for challenges of awards in open court. Without
this second exception, awards will be final and binding in almost all
circumstances.
D. Expedited Procedures
The final aspect of arbitration that may hinder the due process rights of
unnamed class members is the general informality and expedited nature of
arbitration in comparison to litigation. As with the other characteristics of
arbitration mentioned above, the informal nature of arbitration is one of the
procedure's attractive features.94 Parties elect to go to arbitration in order to
save time and money. However, if the procedures employed by the parties
and the arbitrator become too abbreviated, they might deprive the
participants of their due process rights associated with having a day in court
and being adequately represented.
The Supreme Court has not explicitly stated what procedures are due
absent class members, other than adequate notice and representation. The
Court has not addressed issues such as numbers of witnesses or appropriate
discovery because the court system guarantees each party the right to
extensive discovery and the right to proceed in a manner to best suit each
side. An arbitrator, however, may wish to limit the number of witnesses
called or the amount of time it would take for discovery.95 In this respect, the
94 Lisa Bernstein, Understanding the Limits of Court-Connected ADR: A Critique of
Federal Court-Annexed Arbitration Programs, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 2169, 2243-44 (1993)
(stating that informalities best help resolve disputes between persons who are apt to
settle); Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice
in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 1359, 1366-67 (1985) (noting that
informalities of ADR processes allow participants to feel more comfortable in resolving
their disputes); Ronald T.Y. Moon, Visions of a New Legal System: Could There Be a
Legal System That Better Incorporates the Strengths of ADR and Existing Legal
Institutions?, 15 REV. LITIG. 475, 481-82 (1996) (finding that informalities of ADR are
likely to increase participation in the ADR process).
95 See Jason F. Darnall & Richard Bales, Arbitral Discovery of Non-Parties, 2001 J.
Disp. RESOL. 321, 335-36 (2001) (arguing that arbitrators should have more discretion in
determining what discovery is necessary and relevant in a given case); Wendy Ho,
Discovery in Commercial Arbitration Proceedings, 34 Hous. L. REV. 199, 218-19 (1997)
(stating that there are few rules regarding arbitrators and discovery, so each arbitrator sets
his or her own rules in each arbitration); Monica Petraglia McCabe, Arbitral Discovery




absent class members may not be adequately represented by the named
parties if the named parties do not have sufficient time or resources to present
a compelling case.
Perhaps the easiest way to address this problem is through a more liberal
judicial review. 96 The challenging parties can show that the arbitrator acted
improperly when determining how to structure the process so that a
legitimate case could be made on each side. The biggest consequence to
addressing these concerns through judicial review is that the problem would
be addressed on the back-end, rather than when the problem is occurring.
Another option would be that class members could opt out of the arbitration
if they view the procedure as ineffective. Because judicial review and the
ability to opt out can remedy most of these miscellaneous procedure
problems, additional rules regarding discovery and the hearing procedure
may not be necessary. However, Congress and individual states should keep
these concerns in mind when determining the best procedures in class-action
arbitration.
VI. CLASS ARBITRATION PROCEDURES TO PROTECT DUE PROCESS
As noted above, general arbitration rules potentially deprive the unnamed
class members of the due process rights that they would receive under
litigation in the federal courts. Although these class members, by virtue of
signing identical arbitration clauses, may have waived their rights to a trial
and to due process guarantees, the rules and regulations surrounding class
action arbitrations should be reviewed in light of these due process concerns.
This section will examine three reforms, two of which are already in practice,
and one of which is a potential reform. This article, however, advances none
of these approaches, but instead advocates for a completely new approach
that attempts to utilize the best features of these procedures in a more
efficient format.
A. An Extension of the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act Provision on
Consolidation
The first way to regulate class-action arbitration would be to apply rules
similar to those of consolidation to the process. 97 A consolidation is a
(1986) (finding that agreements to arbitrate can expressly limit discovery; otherwise, the
arbitrator will have to make these determinations).
96 See supra Part 1V.B.
97 The RUAA and several states already have consolidation provisions. REVISED
UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT § 10, reprinted in GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 90, at 631;
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procedure in which similarly situated plaintiffs (or potentially defendants)
join their claims together into one action.98 In this action, all of the affected
parties to a dispute are sitting around the same proverbial "table";
conversely, in a class action, there are absent members. If a consolidation can
work in order to resolve multiple claims in one proceeding, extending it to
class-action arbitration could also potentially resolve class action claims.
The Revised Uniform Arbitration Act (RUAA) was promulgated in
2000, and it includes a section on consolidation. This section was added in
order to give courts and parties a more efficient way to deal with similar
claims. 99 The procedure set forth by the RUAA requires the courts-not the
arbitrators-to consolidate similar claims, but only if one or both of the
parties submits a motion to the court.100 The Act sets forth four factors for a
court to consider before consolidating arbitration claims: (1) whether all of
the parties are bound by the same arbitration agreement; (2) whether the
claims arise from similar circumstances; (3) whether there exists a "common
issue of law or fact"; and (4) whether consolidation would unfairly prejudice
those opposing the consolidation.10 1 Furthermore, the courts would have
discretion to order consolidation as to some issues and leave other issues for
see also CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 1281.3 (West 1982); CAL. Civ. PRO. CODE § 1297.272
(West Supp. 2004); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 684.12 (West 2003); GUAM CODE ANN. § 10111
(1997) (consolidation of medical malpractice claims); HAW. REV. STAT. § 658A-10 (Supp.
2003); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38:2314.1 (West 1989); MASS. ANN. LAWS 251 § 2A (Law.
Co-op. 1992); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38.224 (Michie 2002); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:23B-
10 (West Supp. 2004); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 44-7A-1 1 (Michie 2004); N.Y. C.P.L.R.
§ 7556 (McKinney 1998); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.57 (1999); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-
29.3-10 (Supp. 2003); Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2712.52 (Anderson 2000); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 36.506 (Supp. 1998); PA. STAT. ANN. § 1102 (West 2004); Tx. CIV. PRACT. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 172.173 (Vernon 2004); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-31a-111 (2003).
98 Timothy J. Heinsz, The Revised Uniform Arbitration Act: Modernizing, Revising,
and Clarifying Arbitration Law, 2001 J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 12-13 (2001) (noting that the use
of consolidation can be used in order to keep many cases involving "common issues of
law or fact [to] be resolved in multiple fora").
99 REVISED UNIFORM ARBITRATION AcT pmbl., reprinted in GOLDBERG ET AL., supra
note 90, at 624 ("[T]he underlying reason many parties choose arbitration is the relative
speed, lower cost, and greater efficiency of the process. The law should take these
factors, where applicable, into account. For example, section 10 allows consolidation of
issues involving multiple parties.").
100 Id. § 10(a), at 631 (stating that consolidation is possible "upon [motion] of a
party to an agreement to arbitrate or to an arbitration proceeding, the court may order
consolidation of separate arbitration proceedings as to all or some of the claims")
(alteration original).
101 Id. § 10(a)(l)-(4).
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separate arbitrations. 102 The court, however, cannot order a consolidated
arbitration if the agreement prohibits consolidation. 10 3
Because there is already a framework for consolidating arbitrations, it
would be possible to extend this procedure to class-action arbitrations, even
though RUAA § 10 does not explicitly extend to them.10 4 In Keating v.
Superior Court,l05 the California Supreme Court analogized consolidations
and class actions. 106 This 1982 Court noted that there was no direct authority
on the issue of class action arbitrations, but it found that:
Analogous authority exists, however, with respect to the consolidation of
arbitration proceedings involving a dispute which concerns several parties
each of whom has an agreement with one or more of the others to arbitrate
the dispute. "Although the [Federal Arbitration] Act does not specifically
provide for consolidated arbitrations, courts have frequently ordered
consolidated arbitration proceedings when the 'interests of justice' so
require, either because the issues in dispute are substantially the same
and/or because a substantial right might be prejudiced if separate arbitration
proceedings are conducted. '107
102 Id. § 10(b) ("The court may order consolidation of separate arbitration
proceedings as to some claims and allow other claims to be resolved in separate
arbitration proceedings.").
103 Id. § 10(c) ("The court may not order consolidation of the claims of a party to an
agreement to arbitrate if the agreement prohibits consolidation."). This outcome is
consistent with the Federal Arbitration Act. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2000). Under the FAA, a court
can only enforce an arbitration agreement according to its terms. If the terms expressly
prohibit consolidation, then a court cannot consolidate under either the FAA or the
RUAA.
The RUAA does not address the issue of an arbitration agreement that is silent on
the issue of consolidation. The wording of § 10(c) suggests that a court is only prohibited
from ordering consolidation in cases in which the agreement expressly prohibits
consolidation. Therefore, a court could consolidate arbitrations if the agreement is silent.
Because the RUAA has not been widely adopted, this is an issue that has not yet arisen.
10 4 See REVISED UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT § 10, reprinted in GOLDBERG ET AL.,
supra note 90, at 631. One commentator noted that the issue of class-action arbitration
was "hotly debated," and because of this the Drafting Committee could reach "no
conclusion about class-action arbitration" and that § 10 was not meant to cover class-
action arbitrations. Heinsz, supra note 98, at 15-16.
105 Keating v. Superior Court, 645 P.2d 1192 (Cal. 1982).
106 Id. at 1208.
107 Id. (citing In re Czamikow-Rionda Co., Inc., 512 F. Supp. 1308, 1309 (S.D.N.Y.
1981)).
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Although the Keating Court ordered a "hybrid" version of classwide
arbitration, this case notes that courts may be willing to extend consolidation
to class-action arbitrations.
Extending consolidation to class-action arbitrations may be an easy way
to promote them; however, this procedure is flawed for a number of reasons.
First, the limited requirements in RUAA § 10(a) are not guaranteed-or even
likely-to protect the absent class members' due process rights. This section
does not even contemplate notice or adequacy of representation, the most
important due process requirements in class actions. Second, the process
requires that the court, rather than an arbitrator, order the consolidation or
class action. According to the Bazzle Court, the arbitrator makes the initial
inquiry as to whether a consolidation or class action is permissible under the
contract. 10 8 So, the arbitrator must first decide whether the procedure is
permissible, and then the case would have to be sent up to the court for the
consolidation. This creates an impracticable and time-consuming shuffling
between the arbitrator and the courts. Third, the review provisions under the
FAA would still apply. 109 Review, then, would be limited to the narrow
grounds stated in § 10.110 For these reasons, simply extending consolidation
to class-action arbitration would not be the best solution to preserve the due
process rights of absent class members.
B. The California "Hybrid" Procedure
California has designed a "hybrid" procedure for class-action arbitrations
in which the courts have the power to oversee and rule on virtually all
matters of law. This form of arbitration is cumbersome, but it is designed this
way to protect the absent class members, especially when the arbitration
agreements are present in contracts of adhesion.
The Keating Court was the first court to order hybrid arbitration. The
case involved a contract of adhesion between franchisors and franchisees."' l
108 See supra Part II.
109 The Supreme Court has been clear that any state laws that are in contravention to
the FAA are preempted by the FAA. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co.,
388 U.S. 395,405 (1967).
110 See supra Part V.B.
111 Keating, 645 P.2d at 1195-96. All of the franchise agreements were for the
company 7-Eleven, and the franchisees were described as generally powerless to change




The court ordered a classwide arbitration, but it noted that the district court
would have to be heavily involved in the procedure.1 2 The court stated:
Without doubt a judicially ordered classwide arbitration would entail a
greater degree of judicial involvement than is normally associated with
arbitration, ideally "a complete proceeding, without resort to court
facilities." The court would have to make initial determinations regarding
certification and notice to the class, and if classwide arbitration proceeds it
may be called upon to exercise a measure of external supervision in order to
safeguard the rights of absent class members to adequate representation and
in the event of dismissal or settlement. A good deal of care, and ingenuity,
would be required to avoid judicial intrusion upon the merits of the dispute,
or upon the conduct of the proceedings themselves and to minimize
complexity, costs, or delay. 113
This court specifically noted that a court would have to protect the due
process rights of absent class members by ordering certification, notice,
adequacy of representation, and other aspects of a class action. Furthermore,
the court stated that it would be possible, albeit difficult, for a court to allow
the arbitrator to rule on the merits without interfering too much.
Because the class action arbitrations that have occurred to date in
California are confidential procedures, it is unclear exactly how the hybrid
procedure takes place. The only thing that is clear from the Keating case is
that the court is heavily involved in the proceeding and that the arbitrator is
supposed to determine the merits of the case.
In the wake of Bazzle, however, it is unclear whether the court or the
arbitrator is supposed to certify the class action. The holding of Bazzle is
limited to the question of arbitrability, but the issue of certification is so
closely related to arbitrability that it is not inconceivable that Bazzle's
holding could be extended to certification and beyond. But even if Bazzle is
limited to the issue of arbitrability, the hybrid arbitration is a cumbersome
procedure. In the wake of Bazzle, a typical classwide arbitration would first
start with the arbitrability question determined by the arbitrator. 114 Then, the
parties would have to appear before a court for certification and
dissemination of notice. Then, the merits of the case would be heard by the
112 Id. at 1209.
113 Id. (citations omitted).
114 California courts are now referring cases back to arbitrators to make the initial
arbitrability determination. See Yuen v. Superior Court, 121 Cal. App. 4th 1133, 1135
(Cal. Ct. App. 2004); Omar v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 118 Cal. App. 4th 955, 960 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2004).
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arbitrator, but if a question of adequacy of representation were to arise, the
case would go back up to the court and then back down to the arbitrator. The
courts in California would probably also entertain other issues and motions
brought before it during the arbitration. This hypothetical case serves to
demonstrate that the procedure benefits little from the otherwise streamlined
arbitration process.
Yet, despite all of the judicial intervention, the California hybrid
procedure appears to satisfy the due process rights of the absent class
members. The court would rule on the notice, certification, and adequacy of
representation issues, thus alleviating any fears that an arbitrator is unable to
handle these issues. Furthermore, because the court rules on these crucial
issues, the problem of judicial review of constitutional issues is probably not
as big a concern as if the arbitrator made these decisions.
Although the due process rights of absent class members are protected
under the hybrid arbitration, this system is still inadequate because of the
cumbersome relationship between the courts and the arbitrators. The hybrid
system assumes that the courts are better equipped to follow the law, and this
is why the court must interfere in the case to such a high degree. If there were
more stringent qualifications on who could be an arbitrator in a class action
claim, then the arbitrator may be able to handle more of the case without so
much supervision. Another potential drawback to the hybrid system is that it
is a judicially created doctrine that could evolve differently in different
states. A more satisfactory method of creating a system of class action
arbitration would be a uniform state law or an amendment to the FAA.
C. Class-Action Arbitration Under the AAA Rules
Following the Bazzle decision, the AAA created Supplemental Rules for
Class Action Arbitrations. 115 In order to carry out these new rules, the AAA
has established a special panel of class-action arbitrators, and at least one
115 AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, SUPPLEMENTARY RULES FOR CLASS
ARBrrRATIONS § l(a) (2003) ("These Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations shall
apply to any dispute arising out of an agreement that provides for arbitration pursuant to
any of the rules of the American Arbitration Association where a party submits a dispute
to arbitration on behalf of or against a class or purported class .... "). The Supplemental





arbitrator from this list will be appointed to any arbitration proceeding under
these rules. 116
These new Supplementary Rules attempt to incorporate both the Bazzle
ruling and the elements of Rule 23. The Rules explicitly note that the
arbitrator is to make the initial arbitrability question, thus satisfying the rule
in Bazzle. 117 They require that the arbitrator make this initial determination
within thirty days, and that the arbitrator can proceed with the class action if
none of the parties seek judicial review of this decision. 118 If none of the
parties seek review, or if the judicial ruling allows the arbitrator to proceed
with the class action, the arbitrator, then, must determine whether or not to
certify the class.119
When determining whether a class action is appropriate, the arbitrator
must first determine if the prerequisites to a class action have been
satisfied. 120 The first five prerequisites are familiar: (1) numerosity of
claimants, (2) commonality of an issue of law or fact, (3) typicality of the
representative plaintiffs claim, (4) the representative parties who would
adequately represent the interests of the class, and (5) the class counsel who
adequately represents the interests of the entire class. 121 The AAA Rules
contain an additional requirement-that "each class member has entered into
an agreement containing an arbitration clause which is substantially similar
to that signed by the class representative(s) and each of the other class
members."' 122 If all of these prerequisites are satisfied, the arbitrator can then
determine if a class is maintainable.
116 Id. § 2(a) ("In any arbitration conducted pursuant to these Supplementary Rules,
at least one of the arbitrators shall be appointed from the AAA's national roster of class
arbitration arbitrators.").
117 Id. § 3 ("[T]he arbitrator shall determine as a threshold matter, in a reasoned,
partial final award on the construction of the arbitration clause, whether the applicable
arbitration clause permits the arbitration to proceed on behalf of or against a class.").
118 Id.
119 Id. §§ 3, 4.
120 Id. § 4. This is one example of how the new AAA rules are attempting to follow
Rule 23 closely. The AAA rules and Rule 23 each use the word "prerequisite" to describe
the initial determination of appropriateness for class status. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
121 AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, SUPPLEMENTARY RULES FOR CLASS
ARBITRATIONS § 4; see also supra Part III for a discussion of these requirements in a
federal class action.
122 AMERICAN ARBITRATION AssOcIATION, SUPPLEMENTARY RULES FOR CLASS
ARBITRATIONS § 4(a)(6). In some ways, this additional requirement may be superfluous.
If some class members had signed an agreement and others had not, then the arbitration
presumably could not be binding on them anyway. Also, if the parties to an arbitration
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In order to determine if the class action is maintainable, the arbitrator has
to, essentially, determine if the common issues of law and fact "predominate"
over otherwise individual questions.' 23 To determine whether or not there are
predominating issues, the arbitrator can consider the following: (1) whether
there are individuals who would rather proceed separately; (2) whether other
proceeds have already been initiated by other class members; (3) whether all
of the claims can be combined in one forum; and (4) whether there will be
difficulties in managing the class. 124 The purpose of these provisions is to
determine if a class procedure is the best procedure or whether separate
arbitrations would best serve the interests of the justice and the parties.
-If the arbitrator decides that a class-action arbitration is appropriate, then
the arbitrator must; in writing, address all of the prerequisites and
predominance issues in a reasoned award. 125 This award should also contain
the names of the class representatives, their counsel, a description of the
certified class, a description of the claims and issues, and a description of
how notice will be distributed to absent class members.' 26 After an arbitrator
certifies the class, the proceeding must be stayed for a period of thirty days
for any party to seek judicial review of this determination. 127 Once the thirty-
day limitation is over and no one has sought review, or once a court instructs
the arbitrator to continue with the case, the arbitrator can proceed. 128
After an arbitrator certifies the class, the arbitrator then must oversee the
process of notifying the absent class members of the arbitration. 129 The
agreement had signed substantially different agreements, then the claim of the
representative plaintiff may no longer be typical of that of the rest of the class. Although
this provision may not be necessary, it does serve as a reminder to the arbitrator to be
assured that all of the claimants have signed similar agreements.
123 Id. § 4(b). This section requires that:
An arbitration may be maintained as a class arbitration if the prerequisites of
subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition, the arbitrator finds that the questions of
law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions
affecting only individual members, and that a class arbitration is superior to other
available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.
Id.; see supra Part I for a discussion of the parallel provisions in Rule 23.
124 AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, SUPPLEMENTARY RULES FOR CLASS
ARBITRATIONS § 4(b)(1-4).
125 Id. § 5(a).
126 Id. § 5(b).
127 Id. § 5(d).
128 Id.




notice must be the "best notice practicable under the circumstances." 130 The
notice, too, must be "given to all members who can be identified through a
reasonable effort." 131 Direct notice, then, would be best, but notice by
publication should be sufficient if it is impossible to know the identities of
the class members. The notice must state the following in a clear and concise
manner: (1) the "nature of the action," (2) the definition of the certified class,
(3) the "class claims, issues, or defenses," (4) that any member may
participate in the claim, (5) that the arbitrator will exclude from the class
members who have opted out, (6) that the class judgment will be binding on
absent class members, (7) biographical information on the arbitrator and that
the arbitrator has been approved to hear the claim, and (8) instructions as to
how a class member can access information about the action.132
The arbitrator, then, must schedule hearings and ultimately make a
determination on the merits of the case. 133 The award must be in writing, and
it must be reasoned. 134 The award must also define the class and state who
received notice of the proceedings. 135 These rules do not make specific
provisions for post-award judicial review, but this is clearly allowed under
the FAA. 13
6
The AAA Rules explicitly reject the presumption of confidentiality in
class action arbitrations. 137 The arbitrator must allow class members to
participate or attend hearings, but the arbitrator can elect to make the
hearings and filings available to the general public. 138 Futhermore, the AAA
will maintain on its website the "Class Arbitration Docket" which will
contain information relating to class arbitrations, including the names of the
parties and counsel in class arbitrations, lists of awards rendered by given
arbitrators, and a schedule of known hearings. 139 These confidentiality
130 Id. This notice requirement is modeled after the Mullane test. It appears that the
drafters are attempting to provide notice to the absent class members in a manner which
would not compromise their rights to due process if the case had proceeded through
litigation.
131 Id.
132 Id. § 6(b)(1-8).
133 Id. § 7.
134 Id. § 10.
135 Id. § 7.
136 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2000).
13 7 AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, SUPPLEMENTARY RULES FOR CLASS
ARBITRATIONS § 9(a).
138 Id.
139 Id. § 9(b).
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rules-or lack of confidentiality rules-make class arbitrations more similar
to class litigation. Although the proceedings may no longer be confidential,
they will become more transparent, and this will help protect all of the parties
involved.
These new class action rules attempt to protect the due process rights of
absent class members. The rules embody principles set forth by the Supreme
Court and principles found in the Federal Rules. Yet, despite these advances
in protection for the absent class members, there are still three significant
flaws in this resolution to the problems surrounding class action arbitrations.
First, the AAA Rules allow for judicial review at three distinct times
without considering that judicial review would have to be conducted
according to the FAA. The FAA rules on judicial review, as noted above, 140
are a limited remedy for. unsatisfied litigants. Because FAA review can only
lead to a vacatur of an award for misconduct or bias, 141 and because these are
very difficult claims to prove, the review may be practically meaningless.
The problems of arbitrator distrust and irreversible arbitration awards will
still be present if the AAA Rules remain unchanged.
Second, the fact that the process allows for judicial review on three
occasions could significantly slow down -the class action- arbitration.
Furthermore, the possibility of appealing the decisions of the arbitrator to a
court on three occasions has the potential to raise the cost of arbitration
exponentially. The underlying reason for these extensive opportunities for
judicial review can only be mistrust of the arbitrators and the availability of
limited review. However, parties may not be willing to proceed under the
AAA rules if the procedure has the potential to become so burdensome.
The final problem with the AAA rules is that these are rules adopted by
one organization, and they are only applicable if the parties chose to proceed
under these rules. If the parties contract to submit their claims under the rules
of a different provider organization, or no provider organization at all, then
the class members will not have these protections. 142 While the AAA should
be commended for quickly creating rules to deal with Bazzle and Rule 23, a
uniform state law or a revision to the FAA would better address these
concerns on a more consistent, national basis.
140 See supra Part V.B.
141 9 U.S.C. § 10.
142 Currently, only the AAA has rules regarding class action arbitrations. The other
arbitration provider organizations have either not yet addressed this issue or have not




VII. A NEW APPROACH: INCREASING THE AUTHORITY OF THE
ARBITRATOR AND INCREASING JUDICIAL REVIEW TO ENSURE BOTH DUE
PROCESS PROTECTIONS AND EFFICIENCY
This Article proposes a new approach to the problems of class action
arbitrations that draws heavily from the AAA rules, but with some significant
changes. This approach would greatly increase the authority of the arbitrator
by allowing the arbitrator to rule on the issues of arbitrability, certification,
notice, settlement, and the merits of the case. But, this would be balanced by
an increased judicial review at the end of the entire proceeding. However, in
order for this approach to be feasible, legislatures must be willing to trust
arbitrators and give them power to make decisions that have been
traditionally made by courts in class-action litigation.
The key to this new approach is to allow the arbitrator to rule on all
issues surrounding the case from start to finish without any type of
"interlocutory appeal" to a court. Although parties to a judicial class action
do have the opportunity to make interlocutory appeals after certification has
either been granted or denied, parties choose to go to arbitration in order to
have a quick and streamlined process.' 43 A procedure such as the hybrid
arbitration or the AAA arbitration that allows multiple appeals to a court
loses the efficiency and speed that initially drew the parties to arbitration.
The arbitrator, though, must still protect the due process rights of the
absent class members, even if there is a valid waiver of constitutional
protections. The arbitrator should follow the requirements of Rule 23 and
Supreme Court case law concerning certification, notice, and adequacy of
representation. These requirements would have to be codified in either a
uniform state law or as an amendment to the FAA.
This new law should also place restrictions on who can serve as an
arbitrator in a class-action arbitration. Requiring that each arbitrator have a
law degree is not an unreasonable requirement because the arbitrator is
responsible for performing these important tasks. Certainly, states can require
other qualifications, such as experience in class-action litigation or
arbitration, if they conclude that this would best protect unnamed class
members. Another alternative could be to include an "adequacy of
representation" requirement for the arbitrator. Although the arbitrator
certainly cannot represent any or all of the parties, the arbitrator could be
required to adequately represent the due process concerns of all parties.
Looking to the Federal Rules for guidance, a state could use the Rule 23(g)
considerations for adequacy of class counsel to also apply to adequacy of
143 See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
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class arbitrator. Furthermore, states could maintain registries of approved
class arbitrators or have specific training requirements for class-action
arbitrators. These precautions need to be taken in order for the parties and the
public to trust the arbitrator to act in a just manner when proceeding though
the action from start to finish.
Once the arbitrator has concluded with the entire action, the parties to the
dispute need to have some access to meaningful judicial review. Clearly,
FAA § 10 review is not sufficient for a proceeding with such magnitude as a
class action. A revision to the judicial review provisions of the FAA, then,
will be necessary. 144 The judicial review should be available for a judge to
review all aspects of the class action, including certification, notice, and the
merits of the case. Because most class action appeals are heard on an "abuse
of discretion" standard, 145 it seems to be an appropriate standard for review
of an arbitrator's decision. However, Congress or state legislatures could
expand the review if they find a broader review more appropriate.
The final issue to be addressed is confidentiality. Confidentiality is
crucial to any ADR process, including arbitration. 146 For this reason,
confidentiality should be maintained even in class arbitration. This
confidentiality should not be limitless, however. As in the AAA rules, each
class member should have the right to appear before, participate in, or
observe the hearing. 147 Furthermore, confidentiality would need an exception
for admission of evidence during judicial review. This exception would be
similar to the exception for admitting evidence of arbitrator bias or
misconduct that is already part of many arbitration statutes, including the
RUAA.148 Any additional exceptions to the general rule of confidentiality
may have the effect of creating mistrust in the procedure.
144 Unfortunately, any potential revision to the FAA would be an uphill battle. Most
commentators have urged revisions of the FAA, but Congress has been unresponsive.
Any attempt at revising this outdated statute has been denied.
145 See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
146 See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
147 The ability to participate in the arbitration hearing itself, while related to
confidentiality, is not a confidentiality concern. The class members are part of the action,
and as such, they should have a right to know what how the action is proceeding. Even
though the members are "absent" class members, this should not preclude them from
information relating to the claim. Furthermore, common sense would dictate that
confidentiality cannot prohibit a party to a suit from taking part in or knowing about his
or her claim.
14 8 See REVISED UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT § 14, reprinted in GOLDBERG ET AL.,
supra note 2, at 633.
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If the arbitrator is given increased power to conduct the hearing without
interruption, and the courts are given increased power to review the decision
of the arbitrator, then class-action arbitrations could be conducted in a
manner that both protects unnamed class members and retains the speed and
efficiency that the parties hope to gain from arbitration. This proposal
requires increased trust in arbitrators, but placing qualification on arbitrators
should help to increase trust in the process.
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